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This study presents Penny, a virtual assistant that monitors various parameters and 
conditions of the user’s machine and notifies them in case it senses a potential 
vulnerability. Penny also provides the user with information on the possible ways of 
eliminating or avoiding the vulnerability. The purpose of the study is to find out how 
specific types of security-related communication with end-users by a virtual assistant like 










Despite the significant advances in cybersecurity [3, 8], many people still fall 
victim to numerous attacks. This can be credited to their inability or reluctance to use the 
modern cybersecurity capabilities to protect their machines. The significance of the issue 
manifests itself in various situations. Due to the leaks of credit card numbers, many users 
to lose their money every day. Lots of private files get stolen just because of disabled 
two-factor authentication. One of the main goals of studies in usable security and privacy 
is to prevent such situations by making the cybersecurity features more understandable or 
easy to use, thus increasing the likelihood of users engaging in safe security behaviors [3, 
5, 8].  
There are many angles from which one can approach this problem. Some 
researchers determined the influence of social factors on users’ security-related decision 
making by exposing them to the trends in the security decisions that other people make 
and analyzing how it changes such decisions of the users [2, 3].  Redmiles et al. and 
Herley et al. designed mathematical models explaining why the users do or do not make 
security decisions in certain situations [4, 5]. At the same time, separately and so far quite 
unrelated to the field of usable security and privacy, there has been quite a large amount 
of research and work done to this day in development of personal virtual assistants [1], 
which are becoming more and more popular nowadays. 
The goal of our team is to examine the potential synergy of these two areas. We 
are developing a virtual assistant, Penny, whose job is to monitor the condition of the 





considered a potential vulnerability. The information Penny provides to the end-user will 
include the description of the vulnerability and potential threats it may present as well as 
the possible ways of resolution. Considering it has been shown that awareness and 
understanding of security issues has a positive impact on making rational security 
decisions [6], we hope that such an assistant can increase the chances of a user engaging 
in safe personal security behaviors. Furthermore, since social factors (i.e. exposure to the 
security-related choices of others) have already been demonstrated to influence users’ 
security decision making [2, 3], we want to find out if pseudo-social interactions with a 
virtual assistant can help to achieve a similar effect. The ultimate goal of our research is 
to develop Penny and conduct a user study to analyze the effect of exposure to a virtual 








Considering the rising levels of computerization of various aspects of lives of 
modern people, the problem of usability of security tools and features is relevant 
nowadays as the significance of people’s cybersecurity is becoming comparable with the 
obvious importance of their physical security. Issues associated with usability of personal 
cybersecurity have been approached by different researchers from a variety of angles, 
some of which are discussed in this section. 
 One of the particularly interesting approaches revolves around an attempt to tie 
together users’ security and social factors. A successful study by Das et al. determining 
the importance of social aspect in increasing users’ awareness of security issues was 
presented in their paper in 2014 [2]. In this study, randomly selected Facebook users were 
shown different security announcements. Some of these announcements had information 
on how many friends of a user were already using a certain security feature, and some 
had no socially oriented section in them. The work demonstrated that the announcements 
employing social proof drove 37% more users to explore security features, thus showing 
that just displaying the number of friends using the security features to a user can help 
significantly in raising the awareness of such features. In another paper [3], via 
interviews and quantitative data analysis, Das et al. found a strong connection between 
social processes and users’ awareness of, motivation to use and knowledge of how to use 
security and privacy tools and features. They also distinguished two main goals of a 





gather information about solving a privacy problem. Observability of a security feature 
was defined by them as the key enabler of socially triggered security behavior change. 
Quantification and rationalization of users’ behavior constitute another significant 
portion of research conducted in the field of usable security. For instance, in their work 
[4], Redmiles et al. tried to model a situation where a user is forced to make a potentially 
meaningful security decision to measure the cost and utility of adopting a security 
behavior given the time spent on the execution of the latter and some external data such 
as the participant’s wage. An experiment was set up where the user has to create a bank 
account on a website, and they can either enable two-factor-authentication for it or not. 
The user is notified of the potential risk of losing their money beforehand. More than 
50% of the participants of the experiment were found to make utility optimal––in terms 
of cost and benefit––decisions in this setting.  Redmiles et al. have also found that users’ 
decisions can be modeled quite well as a function of their past behavior and other 
parameters such as the knowledge of costs and awareness of risks and context. This work 
strengthened the claim previously made by Herley that users tend to make much more 
rational security decisions than it may seem by demonstrating a clear tendency towards 
optimization in such decisions [5]. These findings imply that focus of the work of usable 
security engineers and researchers should be shifted from making the users make rational 
decisions to making these decisions actually rational. In our research, we want to see how 
an interaction with a virtual assistant, which will explain the rationale behind the specific 
security-related decisions to the end-user, will help users better understand which actions 





Users’ awareness of the outcomes and the supposed rationale of their security 
decisions is also treated as one of the key factors in improving the usability of security. 
We cannot guarantee that a professional researcher or engineer will always be able to put 
themselves into the place of the end-user and try to look at the situation from their 
perspective and level of awareness. This problem is discussed in detail in the work by 
Abu-Salma et al., which presents a study of end-users’ perception of secure 
communication tools and their security properties, and how certain mental models (i.e. 
erroneously applying telephony-related concepts to digital communication) underpin 
people’s beliefs [8]. Through an analysis of the data collected from interviews, they 
proved that a significant part of users does not have a comprehension of the essential 
concepts of protection the secure communication tools offer. One of the main arguments 
proposed by the study is that there is a strong necessity to understand how majority of the 
users perceive security of communication and what makes them decide to whether or not 
to adopt secure tools, in order to design and build communication tools that protect user. 
Many other researchers also distinguish increasing users’ awareness of specific 
consequences of their decisions as one of the most important aspects of user interaction to 
take into consideration for usable security tools implementation [6, 7]. Our research, in 
turn, is focused on examining a specific application of these ideas through a virtual 
assistant. 
Independently of the listed works on usable security, substantial progress has been 
made in the research on implementation of personal virtual assistants. One of the most 
prominent examples here is Almond, an open, secure, and programmable virtual assistant 





described by Campagna et al. [1]. The work addresses four major challenges in virtual 
assistant technology: generality, interoperability, privacy and usability – and provides an 
example of approaches to solving each of them in a form of a prototype of an actual 
multi-functional interactive assistant.  
In our study, we want to try approaching the problem of enhancing the 
effectiveness of users’ interaction with security tools from a slightly different angle. We 
want to integrate the data from the previous research on factors impacting users’ security 
decisions into a virtual assistant. Our team is designing an assistant, which will 
proactively notify users about potential vulnerabilities of their machines and provide 
them with necessary information about these vulnerabilities. In this way, we want to 
combine pseudo-social interaction with giving the users an opportunity to make an 
informed decision in a given situation. As there has been no substantial research 
conducted yet on potential influence of virtual assistant on end-users’ security-related 
decision making, we are trying to examine this question in detail. Specifically, our goal is 
to analyze whether such an assistant installed on a user’s device will enhance the quality 







METHODS AND MATERIALS 
Before we can conduct the analysis that we are aiming for, we need to implement 
our assistant itself. For the technical implementation of Penny, we attempted to use the 
technology stack that would allow maximum potential flexibility in case we want to 
change some parts of it in the future for the needs of the research. For this purpose, we 
chose our system to have a modular structure [Fig. 1]. The core of Penny—her business 
logic and vulnerability detection framework—is contained within a local web server 
written in Python, so that it would be totally independent from the front-end and other 
components of the assistant. Then, there is a Chrome browser extension which internally 
operates independently of the server and communicates with the latter through local 
HTTP requests (we are targeting only one specific browser for research purposes to make 
the development process simpler). The extension is used for detection of vulnerabilities 
associated with Internet-related activities of the user.  The next component of the 
structure of our assistant is its user interface. The one we have currently is implemented 
in JavaFX; however, we may add other implementations of the UI in the future to 
potentially make the comparison between effectiveness of them one of the research 
questions that we answer. Just like the extension, the user-facing part is integrated with 
the server through HTTP protocol and its implementation is almost fully independent of 






Figure 1. Architecture of Penny 
To collect data on the effect of Penny’s interactions on users’ behavior, we 
obviously need her to be able to handle some actual security-related scenarios that can be 
encountered by the users in real life. Currently, Penny’s capabilities include but are not 
limited to detection of out-of-date software lacking patches against newly discovered 
vulnerabilities, detection of connections to insecure wireless networks, analysis of the 
state and presence of an antivirus on the user’s machine, identification of requests of 
sensitive information by third-party websites, etc. 
 The most developed—and, at the moment, the most promising—of the scenarios 
based on the aforementioned features is transmission of sensitive information through 
unencrypted wireless networks. An example of this scenario is a situation that can happen 
to virtually any modern-day user of a computer. A user is sitting in a, say, coffee shop 
and connects to its unencrypted Wi-Fi with their laptop. Then, they decide to go online to 
shop for some shoes. After selecting the nicest pair of shoes that they can find, they go to 
the checkout page of the online store to place the order and make a payment. To do the 
latter, they obviously need to enter their credit card information. As soon as they press 





will be readable by any local perpetrator who is patient and skillful enough to intercept 
the data. To prevent this, Penny constantly monitors the presence of sensitive information 
(such as credit card credentials, SSN number, etc.) entry boxes on the websites visited by 
the user. Whenever she detects such a box on a webpage, she checks if the user’s 
machine is currently connected to an insecure wireless network. If so, she immediately 
notifies the user [Fig. 2] and, if asked, explains them the potential solutions to this issue 
(i.e. wait for an encrypted Wi-Fi to make the purchase). 
 
Figure 2. An example of Penny’s warning notification 
Furthermore, as one of its key features, Penny can elaborate more on the details of the 
vulnerability to give the user a better understanding of the rationale that stands behind 
Penny’s recommendations. 
The choice of this sensitive information scenario was not random. To determine 
the most efficient and relevant direction of the development we conducted a survey 
among college students asking them to pick their top-3 cybersecurity-related scenarios 
that they are most afraid of happening to them. Leaks of credit card information and 
SSNs turned out to be the top responses in this survey [Fig. 3]. It is, however, necessary 
to emphasize that this survey is not an official result of this study and was only used to 






Figure 3. Four scenarios that users are most afraid of according to the survey 
As for Penny’s user interface, we wanted it to have a somewhat two-level 
structure. What is meant by this here is that users are able to interact with Penny quickly 
through a GUI (graphic user interface) based interfaces (the way we do with most of 
existing software) as well as through a chat-based interface where they can get answers 
on the questions they have about their security issues and some more detailed feedback in 
general. For example, if we come back to the credit card credentials leak scenario, as 
soon as the user gets Penny’s notification regarding their problem, they have several 
options of the consequent interaction. First, they can just ignore or swipe away the 
notification (this is the kind of behavior we are attempting to minimize). Second, they can 
open Penny, read her concise description of the issue, understand everything, and either 
act accordingly to prevent the vulnerability or press the ignore button to silence Penny on 
this matter. Third, if the user does not understand why the issue should be addressed or 
how exactly they should act to prevent it, they can use the chat interface to aske Penny 
any questions they have [Fig. 4]. 










Figure 4. Mockup of Penny’s two-layer interface 
It would be of course quite beneficial to later change the aesthetics of Penny’s interface 
in order to make the application more appealing to the user, but, since these kinds of 
cosmetic modifications are not exactly the scope of the research that we are conducting 
right now, we leave them as the future work. Aesthetic aspects would be quite important 
for public use of the assistant, but for a lab-based user study, we consider it less crucial. 
The ultimate goal of our research is nevertheless not Penny’s implementation 
itself but the user study that we want to conduct with it. Currently, we are aiming at 
conducting a lab-based study. We will invite recruited participants into the lab, let them 
sit in front of a computer and use Penny in several predesigned scenarios for a certain 
period of time. In the meantime, we will be, electronically and manually, collecting data 
and statistics on various aspects of users’ interactions with our assistant. Despite this 
setup being currently our main one, it would bolster up the conclusions that we draw 





Penny in a natural setting. It would make the ideas delivered in the research somewhat 
more founded in terms of both their applicability to real-world situations. However, such 
a user study setting would be possible only in case a number of significant technical 






RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
As I have said before, we are still working towards the user study after which we 
will have the data to analyze and will be able to draw corresponding conclusions from it. 
However, as we are moving closer to the final point of the research, we are obviously 
envisioning some of our work’s possible applications as well as several issues that may 
arise depending on the specific content of our ultimate results.  
In case we can see a significant improvement of users’ security-related behavior 
under their exposure to Penny, it would mean that our approach may be a viable way of 
increasing the level of personal security in many different contexts. For example, 
incorporating such a social aspect––a virtual assistant specifically––into the operation of 
personal cybersecurity software (i.e. antivirus software) may result in an increase of its 
effectiveness. Results of our research, if positive, may in turn make this potential 
advantage of usage of virtual assistants and pseudo-social interactions more apparent to 
the producers of antivirus software, thus increasing the chances of such ideas to be 
implemented and raising the global level of personal cybersecurity. 
Furthermore, the framework that we will have built for the detection of certain 
types of unsafe user behavior (i.e. unprotected interaction with online payment systems, 
etc.) can be applied to further research projects in our field of study both in our laboratory 
and beyond. We have been keeping such a potential application in mind while building it, 
making it as easy to use for outsiders as we can. 
We have not yet decided on some of the specifics of our user study, but as we are 





between our subjects’ safe security-related behavior and their exposure to our virtual 
assistant, a question may arise regarding the applicability of these results to situations 
outside of a lab setting. In case we face such a problem, a significant part of the future 
work on this project will be focused on making it possible to conduct a field study which 
will give us a better representation of real-life performance of virtual assistants. 
Currently, it seems that there are two main aspects that we need to work on to achieve 
applicability of Penny to a field study. First, we need to improve Penny’s visual design 
and general user experience to make the assistant just more pleasant and convenient to 
interact with in real life. Second, we need to integrate a statistics-gathering module into 
Penny’s backend as this is crucial for collecting the results of any field study. Anyway, 
currently, we are aiming at a lab study as our closest milestone. From there, it will be 
easier to move forward to a field study if such a need arises. 
However, we cannot of course guarantee at the current point, that the results of 
our user study will correlate well with what we expect them to be. There is a possibility 
that our subjects will show little or no improvement in their cybersecurity-related 
behaviors with presence of our assistant. In such a case, we will have to look for any 
issues in our premises or design choices. The problem might occur in the details of 
Penny’s interaction with the user (i.e. format or wording of messages, types of 
notifications, etc.) as well as in our choice of specific security scenarios to address in the 
study. Finally, it may just be the case that, in opposition to our expectations, a virtual 






In any way, as we have neither positive nor negative results yet, we are doing our 
best to minimize the chance of our design choices to negatively affect the conclusiveness 
of our user study by making them as thoroughly adjusted for the study as we can. Our 
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